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1 Introduction
Why does Lars earn a lower wage than Jens, while they both do exactly the same
job, at the same rm, and with equal skills? And why is Pedro red and his colleague
Miguel allowed to stay at the rm, when their employer has to scale down employ-
ment, where again they do the same job? Some might think that the answer to these
questions is obvious: it is simply because Jens and Miguel have a longer tenure at the
rm than Lars and respectively Pedro. This paper provides a simultaneous explana-
tion and o¤ers empirical evidence for these phenomena. Using matched worker-rm
data for Denmark and Portugal, we show that a worker who is hired last, is likely to
be red rst (Last In, First Out; LIFO). Analogously, we show that there is return
to seniority in wages. In both cases, our claims are di¤erent from saying that your
tenure at the job a¤ects negatively your job exit hazard or a¤ects positively your
wage. Seniority is di¤erent from tenure in that it measures the workers tenure rela-
tive to the tenure of her colleagues. Your seniority is your rank in the tenure hierarchy
of the rm. Hence, we need all-encompassing matched worker-rm data to establish a
workers seniority because we need to know the tenure of all the rms workers. Thus,
when we claim that seniority a¤ects your separation risk, we mean that on top of the
negative duration dependence of the hazard rate, being a senior worker with many
more junior colleagues has a further negative e¤ect. Similarly, when we claim that
there is a return to seniority in wages, we mean that on top of the return to tenure
as usually measured, there is return to seniority. To the best of our knowledge, this
paper is the rst to document the existence of a return to seniority in wages.
We devise a simple economic theory for why rms and workers would agree on
applying a LIFO layo¤ rule and why that leads to a return to seniority in wages. Our
theory is based on a dynamic model of the rm with stochastic product demand and
irreversible specic investments for each newly hired worker, similar to Bentolila and
Bertola (1990). Dixit (1989) considers the same model, but then for an individual
worker. Labor demand follows a geometric random walk in these models. Bentolila
and Bertola calculate the optimal hiring and ring points, by considering, for the
current employment level, the expected discounted marginal revenue of hiring an
additional worker, accounting for the expected moment when it is e¢ cient to re that
worker, taking as given all workers currently employed by the rm and disregarding
any workers that might be hired in the future. In this way, the hiring and ring of
each worker can be considered separately of the hiring and ring of all other workers,
transforming a rm level model into a model of an individual worker, as in Dixit
(1989). This turns out to be equivalent to applying a LIFO separation rule. Whereas
Bentolila and Bertola (1990) and Dixit (1989) take wages as given, we allow for wage
bargaining over the surplus generated by the specic investment. Here, we apply an
idea developed by Kuhn (1988) and Kuhn and Robert (1989). Consider the standard
monopoly union model, where the union bargains for wages above the market wage
and the rm reduces its labor demand below the e¢ cient level in response to this
higher wage rate. Kuhn and Robert observe that there is an alternative way for
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workers to extract rents from the rm. Their idea is to bargain for a layo¤ order
and for a wage schedule where inframarginal workers get higher wages than marginal
workers. The rm cannot re the expensive inframarginal workers without rst ring
the cost e¤ective marginal workers. When this wage schedule is properly set, the
rm will pick the e¢ cient employment level. As a consequence of this setup, equally
productive workers receive di¤erent wages, based only on their position in the layo¤
order, just like Lars and Jens in the opening sentence of this paper. Kuhn and
Robert elaborate their ideas in a static framework. Instead, we introduce them in the
dynamic model of Bentolila and Bertola, leading to a return to seniority in wages. We
take an eclectic approach by simply positing a log linear sharing rule of the surplus
of the specic investment. However, we impose one feature that characterizes Nash
bargaining, namely e¢ cient bargaining: as long as there is a surplus, the worker and
the rm will agree on a distribution of that surplus that makes continuation of the
relation mutually benecial. This guarantees that there is always e¢ ciency on the
ring side. Nevertheless, hiring decisions are e¢ cient if and only if cost and revenues of
the specic investment are shared in the same proportions. If not, hiring is below the
e¢ cient level due to a hold up problem. We shall refer to this condition as the Hosios
condition, like in the search theory. We elaborate our model under the assumption
that the rm must pay for the full cost of the specic investment, so that any return
to seniority implies sub-e¢ cient hiring. Under risk neutrality, contractibility of either
specic investment or wages su¢ ces to achieve e¢ ciency, since we can always satisfy
the Hosios condition by using the one to match the other. When workers are risk
averse, any return to seniority is ine¢ cient, as it assigns the worker a risky return that
can better be assigned to the risk neutral rm. As an extension, we consider the e¤ect
of ring cost, accounting for its upward e¤ect on wages.1 By the e¢ cient bargaining
assumption, ring cost does not a¤ect ring, but further deteriorates hiring. Finally,
we consider the role of trade unions in this model. At rst sight, the ideas in Kuhn
(1988) and Kuhn and Robert (1989) seem to suggest the return to tenure to be
higher in unionized rms, since unions are predicted to use the tenure prole as a
rent extraction mechanism. This turned out to be counter-factual: unionized rms
generally have a lower return to tenure, not a higher return, see for instance Teulings
and Hartog (1998: 225). We observe that this ts our theory. The LIFO layo¤ rule
allows for a decentralisation of the bargaining process as required in the absence of
a union leading to higher wages for senior workers. Instead, the political process
within a union would lead to a more egalitarian distribution of the rents among the
workers, that is, to higher wages but a lower wage return to seniority.
In the empirical part, we establish a number of features of our model. We show
that seniority is an important determinant of job separation. Junior workers have
a larger separation probability than senior workers. This e¤ect comes on top of
the duration dependence of the hazard, that is, in addition to the fact that the
1In Bentolila and Bertolas (1990) analysis of the e¤ect of ring costs, wages are xed. Accounting
for the e¤ect on wage setting turns out to be important for the conclusions.
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separation probability declines with the elapsed tenure at the job. Second, we show
that there is a wage return to seniority. Starting from the seminal papers by Altonji
and Shakotko (1987) and Topel (1991), there is a large and still ourishing literature
on the estimation of the wage return to tenure. The problem in this literature is that
within a job spell, tenure is perfectly correlated with experience. Hence, the rst order
term of this return can only be estimated using variation between job spells, but that
introduces all kind of selectivity problems, which this literature sets out to resolve.
We show that this problem is absent in the estimation of the return to seniority, since
seniority is not perfectly correlated with experience. Seniority increases for example
because new workers enter the rm. From that perspective, changes in seniority are
correlated with changes in rm size, though not perfectly. In our regressions, we
use within job spell variation and we include both tenure and rm size as controls;
nevertheless, we are still able to nd wage returns to seniority of 1 to 2 % in Portugal,
and returns half that range in Denmark.
The paper is set up as follows. Section 2 presents our theoretical framework.
In Section 3, we describe the data and the relevant labour market institutions in
Denmark and Portugal, and we present our estimation results. Section 4 summarizes
and concludes.
2 Theoretical framework
2.1 Setup
The model of Bentolila and Bertola (1990) provides a nice starting point for our
analysis. Firms face a stochastic iso-elastic demand curve for their output, in logs:
nt = zt   pt; (1)
where  > 1 is the price elasticity of demand, Nt is demand, Pt is its price; lower
cases denote the log of the corresponding upper cases, so nt is log output. The
variable zt is a market index capturing the exogenous evolution of demand; zt is
assumed to follow a Brownian with drift, such that z  N (; 2). Labor is the only
factor of production. The production function exhibits constant returns to scale.
Without loss of generality, productivity is normalized to unity, so that output is
equal to employment. In the model of Bentolila and Bertola (1990), hiring and ring
of workers is costly. At this stage, we focus on hiring cost, denoted by I. This cost is
interpreted more broadly as the specic investment that has to be made by the rm
at the start of an employment relation. It is irreversible: once made, the cost cannot
be recouped by ending the employment relation. For simplicity, we assume that this
investment can be made instantaneously, so that no time elapses between the start
and the end of the investment process. At the outside market, workers can earn a
reservation wage, which is constant over time. It is most convenient to think of this
reservation wage as the return to self employment. Without loss of generality, it is
normalized to unity: wr = 0, where wr denotes the log reservation wage. We assume
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both workers and rms to be risk neutral.
As a benchmark, we rst analyze the simple case where rms pay workers their
reservation wage and where there are no specic investments required for starting an
employment relation, I = 0. In that case, labor demand can be adjusted costlessly at
each point in time. Hence, the optimal strategy is to maximize instantaneous prots
t:
t = NtPt  Nt;
subject to the demand curve (1). The rst term is total revenue, the second term is
the wage bill. The rst order condition for prot maximization implies
pt= ; (2)
nt= zt   ;
 ln 
   1 > 0:
This ratio is greater than unity due to the monopoly power of the rm at the product
market. The rms price is constant over time, while its labor demand follows a
random walk, a regularity known as Gibrats law, which holds for larger rms, see for
instance Jovanovic (1982).
Next, consider the optimal strategy with specic investments, I > 0. Then,
labor demand cannot be adjusted costlessly. On the hiring side, an additional worker
requires a specic investment, which has to be recouped from future prots. Moreover,
this investment is irreversible, so that delaying hiring has an option value. On the
ring side, ring per se is costless, but irreversible. If demand surges after having
red the worker, the rm is unable to benet from that demand without incurring
the cost of the specic investment again. Hence, retaining the worker has an option
value, too. Bentolila and Bertola (1990) show that the optimal policy of a rm is to
hire workers whenever pt reaches a constant upper bound p+ >  and to re them
whenever pt reaches a lower bound p  < .
The situation is sketched in Figure 1. The hiring bound p+ exceeds  due to the
necessity for the rm to recoup the cost of specic investments and due to the option
value of postponing hiring, while the ring bound p  is below  due to the option
value of postponing ring. The downward sloped curves are the logarithm of marginal
revenue mr () as a function of log employment nt and the market index zt, that is
ln [d (N  P ) =dN ]  mr (n; z) = 1

(z   n)  :
The current value of the market index is denoted by z0 in Figure 1. In the case
I = 0, the rm sets equal log marginal revenue mr (n0; z0) to log marginal cost
wr = 0. Hence: n0 = z0   . There is a wedge  between p0 and mr (n0; z0)
due to the monopoly power of the rm. Any change in zt will immediately a¤ect
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Figure 1: Firing-hiring boundaries with stochastic market index
log employment nt, but will leave the log price constant at . In the case I > 0,
employment is insulated from shocks to the market index zt within certain bounds.
Only when zt rises above zh, the rm hires additional workers to prevent p rising
above p+, and only when the market index falls below zf , the rm res workers to
avoid p falling below p . Hence, pt follows a random walk between p  and p+, while
nt is constant at n0 in this interval. However, when pt drifts outside these boundaries,
the rm uses nt as an instrument to control pt. Then, pt is held constant, and nt starts
drifting, either up (if p = p+), or down (if p = p ). We provide expressions for p+
and p  later on.
2.2 The LIFO rule and rent sharing
For the moment, let us suppose that rms are obliged to apply a LIFO (Last-In-First-
Out) separation rule. Later on, we shall o¤er a rationale why a rm and its workers
would agree to using such a rule. We assume that workers never quit or retire. We
can index each worker by the log employment level of the rm at the date that the
worker is hired: a worker hired at time h gets rank q, q = nh = zh p+. Her seniority
index at time t is dened as nt   q. Hence, the most senior worker has q = 0, and
her seniority index is nt   q = nt, while the least senior worker at time t has q = nt,
and her seniority index is nt   q = 0. The LIFO layo¤ rule says that when a rm
wants to re a worker, it has to re the worker with the lowest seniority nt q. Under
this separation rule, the distribution of completed job tenures is characterized by the
following proposition.
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Proposition 1 Consider a rm that satises the previous assumptions. The dis-
tribution of the completed tenure of workers hired by this rm is equal to the rst
passage time distribution, that is, the distribution of the time it takes a random walk
z, z  N (; 2), with initial value zh, to pass the barrier zh    (p+   p ) for the
rst time. This distribution does not depend on the initial value zh, and hence, it is
identical for all workers hired by the rm, irrespective of the number of workers hired
previously.
Proof: The LIFO layo¤ rule implies that a worker hired at time h, with q = nh,
will be red at the rst moment f > h that employment is back at the level nh and
pf = p
 , since this worker can only be red when all workers hired after, at t > h,
have been red, since their rank is q > nh, whereas all workers that have been hired
before, at t < h, cannot be red before the worker hired at time h is red. Hence,
zh   zf =  (p+   p ) and zh   zt =  (p+   p ) ;8t 2 (f; h). The distribution of the
rst moment where zh   zf =  (p+   p ) is independent of the starting value zh of
the random walk at time h, due to the Markov property of a random walk.
Bentolila and Bertolas (1990) model of rm level employment supplemented with
a LIFO layo¤ rule corresponds therefore one-to-one with a simple model of individual
job tenures. Buhai and Teulings (2006) analyse the characteristics of the distribution
of completed tenures implied by this model: its hazard rate starts at zero, then rises
quickly to a peak, and then falls slowly, to zero for  > 0; and to some positive
number for  < 0. Buhai and Teulings estimate this model on tenure data for the
United States, and show that if ts the data well.
Why would a rm commit to using a LIFO layo¤ rule? In the simple world
discussed above, where the rm pays the worker her reservation wage, there is no
rationale for such a rule. Since the worker receives her reservation wage, she is indif-
ferent between working at the rm or being laid o¤. Hence, there is no point in xing
an order of layo¤. However, if we relax the assumption that the rm pays its workers
their reservation wage and we attribute incumbent workers some bargaining power,
the quasi rents of the specic investment might enable these workers to capture wages
above the reservation wage. In that case, a layo¤ order carries practical relevance, as
it protects the rightsof senior workers. Kuhn (1988) and Kuhn and Robert (1989) of-
fer a neat further legitimation for using such a rule. Consider the standard monopoly
union model, where the union bargains for union wage rate above the workersreser-
vation wage. The rm reduces its labor demand below the e¢ cient level in response
to this higher wage rate. This leaves some gains from trade unexploited, since there
are workers who would be willing to work at the rm for the reservation wage and the
rm would be willing to hire them, but these trades do not occur because the rm is
not allowed to pay wages below union rate. Kuhn and Robert observe that there is
an alternative way for workers to extract rents from the rm without leaving gains
from trade unexploited. The idea is to bargain simultaneously for a LIFO layo¤ rule
and a wage schedule that grants higher wages to inframarginal workers (those who
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Figure 2: Static vs. dynamic framework
were hired rst, and, by the LIFO rule, are therefore the last to be red) than to
marginal workers. Hence, log wages depend positively on the seniority index nt   q.
We assume this relation to be linear:
w(q; zt) =  mr (q; zt) + ! = 

(zt   q)   + !; (3)
with 0    1.
The situation is depicted in Figure 2, Panel A; the continuous line is marginal
revenue mr (q; z0), the dotted line is the wage schedule w (q; z0). The shaded area is
the surplus of marginal revenue above marginal cost for that level of log employment,
q. As long as the log wage schedule is between the marginal revenue curve mr (q; z0)
and the log reservation wage wr = ! = 0, the rm has no incentive to deviate from
the rst best level of log employment, n0, since the surface of the shaded area is
maximized by setting n = n0. In that sense, equation (3) implies e¢ cient bargaining:
all gains from trade are exploited. Although inframarginal workers earn a log wage
w (q; z) ; q < n0 above the log marginal revenue mr (n0; z0), the rm has no incentive
to re them, because it is obliged to re the less expensive marginal workers rst. This
wage setting scheme is a form of price discrimination on the side of the union. The
parameter  can be interpreted as the bargaining power of workers.2 The case  = 1
2Strictly speaking, this interpretation lacks a foundation in a formal bargaining model. In the
case of a single worker rm, where we could apply the theory of two player bargaining, as in Buhai
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corresponds to rst degree price discrimination, where the union has full bargaining
power. In case  = 0, workers have no bargaining power and they get just their
reservation wage. The return to seniority, =, is increasing in the bargaining power
of the workers, , and in the monopoly power of the rm,  1. Since 0    1 and
 > 1, this return is between zero and unity.
Figure 2, Panel A, corresponds to the original model of Kuhn and Robert (1989),
who specify their theory in static framework. In the dynamic framework à la Bentolila
and Bertola (1990) that we apply here, there are some complications, see Figure 2,
Panel B. Since investment I is irreversible, workers have an option value for the rm.
Hence, the rm keeps workers when marginal revenue has fallen just slightly below
marginal cost, that is, when wr > mr (n0; z0) > p    . Similarly, the marginal
worker, q = n0, prefers staying employed at the rm even when her wage rate is
just slightly below the reservation wage, wr < w (n0; z0) < !, since by quitting the
worker loses the option value of benetting from the market index zt rising above
z0 at later stage, and hence log wages rising above wr. Hence, for some range of
z 2 [zf ; z0], marginal revenue is below marginal cost, mr (n0; z) < wr, and wages are
below reservation wages, w (n0; z) < wr. Hence, whereas wr is the outside wage for a
worker, ! is the reservation wage for a worker currently employed by the rm. Only
when w (n0; z0) is below !; ! < wr, the marginal worker (for whom q = n0) wants to
quit the rm, because the prospect of future wage increases no longer outweighs the
cost of the current wage being below the outside wage.
Since Kuhn and Robert (1989) specify their theory in a static framework, the layo¤
ordering can be based on any variable, height, IQ, experience, or what else springs to
mind. When using the dynamic framework of Bentolila and Bertola (1990), ordering
layo¤s by a LIFO rule has a natural economic rationale. The senior workers future
wage claims are sensitive to the rm hiring new workers, since after the specic
investments have been made, these new workers are perfect substitutes for senior
workers. The rm could in principle hire new workers for a low wage, and re the
senior workers instead. Hence, senior workers have an incentive to block the hiring of
new workers. Suppose that the specic investment of new workers is largely made up
from acquiring the tacit knowledge of the rms production process and the transfer
of this knowledge is a monopoly of senior workers, or suppose that senior workers can
harass newcomers, as suggested by Lindbeck and Snower (1990). In that case, hiring
new workers requires the consent of senior workers. So, the rm has an incentive to
commit on not using new hires as substitutes for senior workers. A LIFO separation
rule serves as a commitment device, by providing senior workers protection against
being laid o¤ before newly hired workers.
and Teulings (2006), the log linear sharing rule would be almost equivalent to Nash bargaining,
which would yield a linear sharing rule.
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2.3 The workers problem
The value of the parameter ! in equation (3) can be derived using the theory of
option values, see Dixit and Pindyck (1994, 136-140)3. E¢ cient bargaining implies
that at the moment of separation, both the worker and the rm are indi¤erent between
continuation of the employment relation. In this section, we analyse the workers side
of the problem, which yields an expression for !. The next section looks at the rms
side of the problem, which yields expressions for the hiring and ring thresholds,
p  and p+. First, we observe that w (q; zt) can be written as function of a single
argument, zt   q, see equation (3), as we do in what follows. Let V (zt   q) be the
asset value of holding a job at a rm. By Itos lemma V (zt   q) satises the Bellman
equation
V (zt   q) = exp [w (zt   q)] + V 0 (zt   q) + 1
2
2V 00 (zt   q) ;
where  is the interest rate. For a bounded solution to exist, we must assume that
 > + 1
2
2. The left hand side is the return on the asset. The rst term on the right
hand side, exp [w (zt   q)], is the current wage income, the second and the third term
are the (expected) wealth e¤ects of the drift and the volatility in the market index
zt. The solution to this second order di¤erential equation reads
V (zt   q) = 1
r (=)
exp

! +


 
zt   q   p 

+ A  exp

  (zt   q)

(4)
+A+ exp

+ (zt   q)

r (x)   x  1
2
(x)2 ;
+;   
p
2 + 22
2
:
where we substitutew (zt   q) from equation(3) and whereA  andA+ are constants of
integration that remain to be determined. r (x) is a modied discount rate, accounting
for the drift and the variability of zt. We have:
r (0)= ; r (1) =     1
2
2 > 0;
 < 0; + > 1:
where the nal inequality follows from  >  + 1
2
2. The rst term of the right
hand side of equation (4) is the net discounted value of expected wage payments,
disregarding the workers option to quit the rm when wages fall too far below the
3Dixit and Pindyck (1994) consider an optimal investment problem instead of an optimal stopping
problem, but this is mutatis mutandis the same. Their notation is somewhat di¤erent in that their
z denotes a geometric Brownian instead of standard Brownian. The equations are exactly the same,
but we feel our notation to be simpler.
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reservation wage. The nal two terms, A+;  exp

+; zt

, are the option value of
separation. Only one of the roots +;  is relevant, due to a transversality condition.
For large values of zt, the rm is doing well and hence, keeping the job is attractive to
the worker for the foreseeable future. The option value of separation must converge
to zero, which is the case for the negative root  , since limz!1A  exp

 z

= 0.
Hence, the constant of integration A+ must be equal to zero.
E¢ cient bargaining implies that it is optimal for a worker with rank q to separate
when zt = q + p . Two conditions need to hold for that value of zt to be optimal:
V (zt   q)= 1
r (=)
e! + A e
 z =
1

;
V 0 (zt   q)= 
r (=)
e! +  A e
 z = 0:
The rst condition is the value matching condition, which states that the asset value
of holding the job should be equal to the asset value after separation, that is, the net
discounted value of the reservation wage,  1. The second condition is the smooth
pasting condition, which states that for small variations in zt the worker remains
indi¤erent between holding the job and separation. Since separation is irreversible,
the worker should not regret separating after a small perturbation of zt. This requires
the rst derivative of V (zt   q) with respect to zt to be zero. Elimination of A  yields
an expression for !:
! = ln r (=)  ln   ln

1  
 

: (5)
Proposition 2 (i) !  0; (ii) @!
@
< 0; (iii) @!
@
< 0; (iv) @!
@
< 0.
Proof: The proof is straightforward calculus.
! is below the log reservation wage wr = 0 since separation is an irreversible
decision. If the demand for the rms product, zt, goes up after the separation
decision, the worker is no longer able to benet from the wage increase. Hence,
workers are prepared to incur some loss before they decide to separate. The higher the
workers bargaining power , the lower is !, since expected future revenues are higher
so that workers are prepared to accept greater losses before separation. Similarly, !
is declining in the drift  since a higher drift raises expected future revenues, and ! is
declining in the variability of demand 2, since a higher variability raises the option
value of hoping for a future increase in the surplus.
2.4 The rms problem
We now turn to the rms optimal strategy. Like w (q   zt), mr (q; zt) can be writ-
ten as a function of q   zt only, as we do in what follows. We observe that hiring
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a worker with rank q a¤ects neither log marginal productivity4 mr (q   zt) nor log
wage w (q   zt), for workers with rank q < q (the workers who have been hired be-
fore worker q). Similarly, whether or not the rm hires any workers q > q after
hiring worker q a¤ects neither mr (q   zt) nor w (q). Furthermore, the option
of ring worker q at a future date is una¤ected by the hiring of workers q > q.
Hence, in its cost calculation, the rm can attribute each worker her marginal rev-
enue exp [mr (q   zt)] and her wage exp [w (q   zt)], taking the employment of workers
hired previously as given, and then consider when it is optimal to hire and subse-
quently re this worker. In this way, we can consider the decision to hire and re the
Nt-th worker (Nt  expnt) separately of the hiring and ring of workers hired before
this worker, and of workers hired afterwards. Then, the model is a straightforward
extension of Dixit and Pindyck (1994: 216), the only di¤erence being that wages
are constant in Dixit and Pindyck, while they vary with the state of demand zt in
this model. Let F (nt   zt) be the asset value of the rm for the Nt-th worker. The
Bellman equation for F (nt   zt) satises
F (nt   zt) = exp [mr (zt   nt)]  exp [w (zt   nt)]+F 0 (nt   zt)+ 1
2
2F 00 (nt   zt) :
The rst term is the marginal revenue of that worker, the second term is the wage
for that worker. The nal two terms capture the option value of separation. The
relevant solution to this di¤erential equation reads
F (nt   zt)= 1
r ( 1)
exp

1

(zt   nt)  

  1
r (=)
exp [w (zt   nt)] (6)
+B  exp

  (zt   nt)

:
The nal term is the option value of separation, with B  being the constant of
integration. As in the case of the worker, the positive root + is irrelevant, due to
a transversality condition: the option value converges to zero for large values of zt.
Suppose the rm employs less than Nt workers. Then, the option value of hiring the
Nt-th worker at some future date is
G (nt   zt) = B+ exp

+ (zt   nt)

; (7)
where B+ is the constant of integration. There are no current costs or revenues, hence
only the option value term matters. Since this option value converges to zero for low
values of zt, only the positive root 
+ applies here. The value matching and smooth
4Note that the function mr (q; zt) measures the marginal revenue of adding the q-th worker,
or equivalently, it is the rms marginal revenue as if employment were only q. When actual
employment is larger, nt > q, the actual marginal revenue of the rm is smaller, see Figure 2, which
is drawn for t = 0.
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pasting conditions read
F
 
zt   p ; zt

=G
 
zt   p ; zt

; (8)
F 0
 
zt   p ; zt

=G0
 
zt   p ; zt

;
F
 
zt   p+; zt

=G
 
zt   p+; zt

+ I;
F 0
 
zt   p+; zt

=G0
 
zt   p+; zt

:
The rst pair refers to the ring decision, the second to the hiring decision. The
rst condition states that at the moment of ring, when by denition nt = zt   p ,
the asset value of keeping the worker is equal to the option value of a vacancy. The
second equation is the smooth pasting condition, which states that this condition also
applies for slight variations of zt, so that the rm wouldnt regret a decision to re
after a slight variation in zt. The third equation is the value matching condition for
the moment of hiring, when nt = zt p+: the asset value of hiring the worker should
be equal to the cost of investment plus the option value of lling the vacancy at a later
point in time. The nal equation is the smooth pasting conditions for the moment
of hiring. This system of four equations determines four unknowns, the constants of
integration, B  and B+, and the hiring and ring boundaries, p  and p+.
Proposition 3 The system of equations (8) has a unique solution for p+; p ; B+; B 
for which (i) p+    > 0 > ! > p    ;B+ > 0; B  > 0; (ii) @B+
@
< 0; (iii) @p
+
@
> 0;
(iv) @p
 
@
< 0.
Proof: see Appendix.
A unique, economically meaningful solution exists, see Proposition 3-(i). In the
static version of the model by Kuhn and Robert (1989), the distinction between hiring
and ring is meaningless, so that there is only a single issue of e¢ ciency, namely the
level of employment. In the dynamic version of the model, the e¢ ciency of hiring and
ring are two separate issues. Since the asset value for outside workers is equal to the
net discounted value of their reservation wage  1, the option value of a rm to hire an
outside worker, on its current level of log employment nt and the value of its market
index zt, is the residual claim in this economy. Any ine¢ ciency shows up as negative
e¤ect on this option value. This option value is proportional to B+, see equation
(7). Hence, Proposition 3-(ii) implies that  = 0 is most e¢ cient, since then B+ is
at its maximum. This result is due to a hold up problem. For e¢ ciency, the Hosios
(1990) condition should apply: the revenues of specic investment should be shared
between players according to their share in the cost of this investment. Since rms are
assumed to bear the full cost I, any share of its revenues being assigned to workers
leads to ine¢ ciency. Hence,  = 0 is most e¢ cient. If  > 0, rms will postpone the
hiring of new workers till the surplus of log marginal productivity mr (q   zt) above
the log reservation wage wr is such that, even though the rm gets only part of that
surplus, its net discounted value is su¢ cient to cover the cost of investment. This
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explains why p+ is positively related to , see Proposition 3-(iii). We now turn to the
ring decision. The elimination of B  from the rst two equations of (8) yields
p   = ln r   1 ln  ln1  1
 

+ln

1  
+    
 
B+ exp

+p 

: (9)
The ring bound p  does not depend on , except for its e¤ect on B+. This is
an application of the Coase theorem: under e¢ cient bargaining, the distribution
of the surplus of the employment relation does not matter for the actual level of
employment. The only exception is the option value of hiring another worker for
this vacancy at a later stage. This option value comes in because at the same time
that the rm res the Nt-th worker, it acquires the option to rehire at a later stage,
provided that it pays the cost I again. This option makes ring more attractive, so
it raises p . The larger is , the lower is this option value of future rehiring, and
the more attractive it is to re a worker, see Proposition 3-(iv). Proposition 3-(iii),
(iv) implies that the higher is the workersbargaining power , the less volatile is the
employment, since employment is insulated from shocks to market index zt over a
larger interval of p  < zt nt < p+, and the larger is therefore the expected tenure
of a newly hired worker. These implications square well with the ndings in Bertrand
and Mullainathan (2003), who show that when rms are insulated from takeovers,
the wages of the incumbent employees are higher, suggesting a higher value of . This
goes hand in hand with lower rates of creation of new plants, which in the context of
our model is similar to a higher hiring bound, p+. Bertrand and Mullainathan also
report a lower rate of destruction of old plants, or in the context of our model, a lower
ring bound, p .
2.5 Unemployment and the welfare cost of hold up
To close the model, we have to explain who gets hired by a rm and who does not.
The log wage of a worker who is just hired is higher than the wage of a worker who
is at the borderline of being laid o¤, that is
w
 
zt   p+; zt

> w
 
zt   p ; zt

= !:
Since the asset value of a worker who is on the borderline of being laid o¤ is equal
to the net present value of her reservation wage, 1=, the asset value of a worker
who is just hired must be higher than 1=. Hence, new jobs at the rm are rationed.
A convenient way to model this rationing process is to introduce unemployment. A
worker who is just laid o¤ has two options. Either she decides to collect her outside
wage by becoming self employed, or she can decide to queue for a new job at a rm.
During this waiting period she cannot produce as a self employed. For simplicity, we
assume that leisure has no value.5 New jobs at rms arrive at a rate  per unit of the
5Allowing for a value of leisure would not change the predictions of model. It would make
unemployment less costly per unit of time, but this e¤ect would be exactly o¤set by the rise in
unemployment.
14
labor force and are distributed randomly among the unemployed. Hence, the asset
value of unemployment, V U , satises
V U =

u

V
 
p+
  V U ;
where u is the unemployment rate. =u is the arrival rate of a new job for unemployed.
The lower unemployment, the higher this arrival rate, since there are less people
among whom new jobs have to be distributed. V (p+)   V U is the asset gain of
getting a job o¤er. The level of unemployment follows from the no-arbitrage condition
between self employment and unemployment
u = 

V
 
p+
  1


; (10)
where we use V U = 1=, the asset value of self employment6. The higher the asset
gain of getting a job at a rm, the higher is unemployment. Hence, there are two types
of ine¢ ciency.7 First, not all gains from trade between the worker and the rm are
exploited. Firms would hire more workers if  = 0, since p+ is an increasing function
of . Firmsperception of the marginal cost of hiring a worker in net present value
terms exceeds the social cost by the same amount as the asset gain for an unemployed
of getting a job o¤er, V (p+)  1=. This gives rise to a Harberger triangle. Next to
this Harberger triangle, there are the cost of rationing that dissipate workerssurplus.
The no-arbitrage condition (10) implies that the workers as a group spoil their whole
share in the quasi rents in wasteful unemployment.
As discussed before, the ine¢ ciency is due to a violation of the Hosios condition
that cost and revenues of specic investments should be shared in the same propor-
tion between workers and rms. At a deeper level, the failure to satisfy the Hosios
condition is due to the combination of the non-veriability of specic investment and
the inability of workers to commit on not using their bargaining power after the spe-
cic investment has been made. If wages were contractible, workers could commit
on not demanding any return to seniority, such that the rm bears the full cost and
gets the full revenues of the specic investment, thereby satisfying the Hosios con-
dition. Alternatively, if specic investments were veriable, the ine¢ ciency would
be resolved by shifting some share of the burden of investment to the worker, such
that workers bear an equal share of the cost of the specic investment as they get
from its revenues, again satisfying the Hosios condition. It is useful to consider this
case where workers share in the cost of specic investment, more closely. The asset
6We assume: u < 1. If u > 1, the outside option of self employment would become irrelevant,
and the reservation wage ! and job arrival rate  would become endogenous. ! would rise till so
many workers are red, and so few workers are hired till  is such that the no arbitrage condition
holds for u = 1.
7Throughout the paper, we do not pay attention to a third type, the ine¢ ciency caused by the
monopoly power of the rm vis-a-vis consumers.
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value of a worker at the moment of hiring, V (p+), is independent of the workers
rank q. Hence, although at a particular point in time senior workers receive a higher
return on their specic investment than juniors, each worker has the same net present
value of expected rents at the moment she is hired, that is, independent of her rank
q. Seniors getting higher rents than juniors at a particular point in time reects the
fact that they are able to realize the upside of the risky returns on their share in the
cost of specic investment I. Hence, the LIFO separation rule can be interpreted
as a protection of their property right of senior workers on their share in the quasi
rents, against the temptation of the rm to re the expensive senior workers, thereby
depriving them from the upside of their risky returns. A LIFO separation rule is then
a device for implementing an e¢ cient contract.
In the basic model of this paper, workers are overcompensated. However, when
workers bear the full cost of the specic investment, the hold up problem is reversed.
Then, the non-veriability of workers investment and the inability of rms to commit
on not using their bargaining power 1  leads to ine¢ ciency. Workers are only willing
to enter the rm when the net present value of quasi rents of their investment are
so high that their share in this present value su¢ ces to cover the cost of investment.
These arguments imply that as long as we do not know what share of the cost of
specic investment is born by workers, empirical evidence showing that there is a
return to seniority in wages is inconclusive on the issue of whether or not employment
is below its ine¢ cient level. However, there is an alternative statistic enabling the
observer to establish which side, either the worker or the rm, is overcompensated in
the ex post bargaining over the quasi-rents of the specic investment: when workers
queue for jobs, so that there is unemployment, rms are held up, as in the basic
model; when rms chase after workers, so that there are vacancies, workers are held
up.
2.6 Explanation of the rm size wage e¤ect?
The rm size e¤ect on wages has been extensively documented, see Brown and Medo¤
(1989). Can our model o¤er an explanation for the rm size wage e¤ect? When we
look at the issue from the point of view of an individual worker, the evolution of
her seniority nt   q is driven by the evolution of log rm size nt. At rst sight, this
suggests that our theory could explain the rm size wage e¤ect. This turns out not
to be true. The average log wage in a rm at the ring bound p  satises
1
Nt
Z nt
 1
w(zt   q)Qdq = 1
Nt
Z nt
 1

! + =
 
zt   q + 1  p 

Qdq = ! + =;
where in the rst expression the factor Q comes in as the Jacobian dQ=dq = Q = eq,
and where in the nal equality we use the fact that at the ring bound, nt = zt p .
Hence, the average log wage does not depend on rm size. The intuition is that
the positive e¤ect on the average log wage of the wage increase for the incumbents is
exactly o¤set by the negative e¤ect of the below average log wage for new hires. Thus,
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although the model predicts rm size to be a driver of wage changes for incumbents, it
does not explain why wages for the rm as a whole depend on rm size. The average
log wage does depend on the parameter =. Other things equal, the model predicts
the return to seniority, =, to be increasing in the average log wage.
2.7 Extensions
Some extensions to this model are worth discussing. First, relaxing the assumption
of risk neutrality on the side of the worker introduces a trade o¤. As discussed in the
previous section, veriability of the specic investment I is su¢ cient to implement
rst best in the standard case with risk neutral workers. With risk averse workers,
this conclusion no longer applies. First best requires that workers get paid their
reservation wage all the time, and hence that rms bear the full cost of investment.
The inability of workers to commit on not using their bargaining power makes rst
best unattainable in that case. The case of risk averse workers and risk neutral rms
is particularly relevant because one can expect capital markets to be more complete
for rms than for workers. It is easier for the rm to diversify rm specic risks on
the capital market than it is for its workers.
A second extension is the introduction of ring cost, imposed either by law or by
trade unions. We think of a ring cost as a wealth transfer L from the rm to the
worker at the moment of ring. By the assumption of e¢ cient wage bargaining, this
wealth transfer has an impact on the wage bargaining process. Firing cost raise value
of the outside option of the worker by the wealth transfer L. The value matching
condition reads V (p ) =  1 + L. Hence, the expression for ! reads, compare
equation (5)
! = ln r (=)  ln   ln

1  
 

+ ln (1 + L) : (11)
Firing cost raises !. Hence, there are two counteracting e¤ects on the ring bound
p : the direct e¤ect of ring cost makes layo¤s less attractive to the rm, while the
indirect e¤ect via higher wages makes layo¤s more attractive, since workers are more
costly due to the higher level of !. The rst order condition for optimal ring now
reads, compare equation (8)
Fz
 
zt   p ; zt

= G
 
zt   p ; zt

+ L;
where we use the value of ! from equation (11) to account for the e¤ect of ring cost
on wages. Some calculation, see the Appendix, shows that the value for p  remains
the same as in equation (9). The direct and the indirect e¤ect cancel therefore exactly,
except for the indirect e¤ect via B+, the option value of rehiring. Again, this is an
implication of the e¢ cient bargaining assumption and the Coase theorem. On the
hiring side, ring cost has two e¤ects with the same sign: rst, it raises wages via
its e¤ect on ! and, second, there is the prospect of having to pay ring cost in case
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of future layo¤. To the extent that workers have excessive bargaining power, as in
the basic model, this increase comes to the detriment of e¢ ciency. The paradox
here is that ring cost aggravates the unemployment problem that it is meant to
resolve. Since the hiring threshold p+ goes up due to the introduction of ring cost,
the expected value of future rehiring is lower, so the ring threshold is lower. Hence,
ring cost raises the distance p+   p  and therefore the expected tenure of newly
hired workers.
Now that we have discussed these extensions, risk aversion and ring cost, it makes
sense to consider the nature of workersbargaining power. Most economists associate
this power with the trade unions.8 Only unions provide workers bargaining power.
Without unions, rms are supposed to have complete bargaining power. A notable
exception are Lindbeck and Snower (1990), who point out that the insidersability to
harass new hires gives them bargaining power vis-à-vis their employer. Without the
insidersconsent, rms are e¤ectively unable to train new hires. The interesting aspect
of Kuhn (1988) and Kuhn and Robert (1989) is that their rank related compensation
scheme allows a decentralization of the bargaining process. As soon as the layo¤
order has been set, each worker can negotiate for herself. When a marginal worker
negotiates a wage increase raising her wage above marginal cost, she endangers her
own employment, not that of the inframarginal workers.9 Hence, a LIFO scheme
enables workers to exploit their individual bargaining power without workers having
to solve their collective action problem. Hence, using a LIFO separation rule is a
rationale of the rm and its workers on a commitment problem. By using this rule,
workers can be sure that training new hires does not threaten their employment at
the rm. When workers are united in a trade union, more elaborate strategies are
available, that yield a higher expected payo¤, in particular when workers are risk
averse. By trading a higher ring cost L; in exchange for a lower seniority premium,
such that the rms asset value F (nt   zt) remains the same, the expected utility
for new hires can be improved by shifting the rm specic risk zt to the rm. The
transfer L allows this insurance to be extended even beyond the time spell covered by
the employment relation with the rm, by providing insurance for the fall in wages
after being laid o¤by the rm. Moreover, the political decision making process within
the union, where senior and junior workers have to compromise on the distribution of
the rents, is likely to generate support for an egalitarian outcome, as implied by the
median voter model.10 All these arguments suggest that the LIFO model is probably
a more appropriate description of a non-unionized than of a unionized environment.
8This problem has been suggested to us by Kevin Murphy.
9The reverse is not necessarily true. An inframarginal worker can bargain a wage above her
productivity, if workers with lower seniority capture less than their full productivity. In that case,
the rm has an incentive not to re the inframarginal worker because it rst has to re the marginal
worker.
10Equation (3) implies a Pareto distribution of wages within the rm, which is heavily skewed to
the right, so that the median voter has a strong incentive to limit the return to seniority.
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These arguments can also explain, why tenure proles are atter in unionized rms,
in contrast to what Kuhn (1988) and Kuhn and Robert (1989) seem to predict, see
e.g. Teulings and Hartog (1998: 225).
3 Empirical framework
The model discussed in the previous section has three testable implications:
1. Gibrats law: log rm size follows a random walk, in particular for large rms.
2. The Last-in-First-Out separation rule: the workers hired last, leave the rm
rst.
3. A return to seniority in wages: a workers wages depends on her seniority in the
rm, that is her tenure relative to that of her colleagues.
We shall analyze these implications empirically. The rst implication is not specic
for our model. Moreover, it has been tested many times before. We show that it
holds for the datasets at hand, just for the sake of completeness. The challenging
aspect of this paper is testing the second and third implication. For that purpose,
we need longitudinal matched employer-employee data. Only by knowing the tenure
distribution of the entire workforce of the rm, at all times, we can calculate the
seniority of a worker. Though using this type of data has become more fashionable
in recent years, they are still not widely available. We have been able to get access
to such data on Denmark and Portugal. We give a brief description of both data sets
from these countries in the next subsection. Subsequently, we discuss the test of the
three implications of our model, each in a separate subsection.
3.1 Data description
For Denmark, we use the Integrated Database for labor Market Research (IDA) for
1980-2001, from the Danish Bureau of Statistics, which has been used previously e.g.
in Mortensen (2003). IDA tracks every single individual between 15 and 74 years
old. The labor market status of each person is recorded once a year, at November
30. The dataset contains a plant identier, which allows the construction of the total
workforce of a plant, and hence of the rm as a whole. There is information on
earnings, occupation, education, and age, and on the plants location, rm size, and
industry. Industry is dened as the industry employing the largest share of the rms
workforce. Firm size is dened as the number of individuals holding primary jobs in
that rm and earning a positive wage. The tenure of workers hired since 1980 can be
calculated straightforwardly from the IDA. For workers hired between 1964 and 1980,
the tenure can be calculated from a second dataset on the contribution histories to a
mandatory pension program, the ATP. The tenure in job spells started before 1964
is left censored (less than 3% of the observations). We calculate potential experience
as age-schooling-6.
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For Portugal, we use the Quadros de Pessoal for 1991-2000 provided by the Min-
istry of Employment, which has been used before e.g. in Cabral and Mata (2003). It
is based on a compulsory survey of rms, establishments and all their workers; the
compulsory participation enhances the quality of the data. The information available
is similar to that for Denmark except that workerstenure is directly reported; the
industry of the rm is that industry with the highest share of sales or, when the allo-
cation by sales is not possible, the industry with the highest employment share. We
use all full-time employees in their main job, aged between 16 and 66, and working for
a rm located in Portugals mainland. The hourly gross earnings were computed as
the monthly base-wage plus seniority-indexed components plus other regularly paid
components, divided by normal hours of work per month.
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For both countries, we use data for all private sector jobs, except agriculture,
shing and mining. We eliminate outliers by deleting all wage observations lower
than the legal minimum wage and drop the top 1% of the wage distribution, for each
year. Summary statistics for both countries are presented in Table 1, both for the
pooled data and for 2000 separately11. There are several obvious di¤erences between
the two countries. The mean level of education is more than 5 years higher in Denmark
than in Portugal, while the mean tenure is almost 3 years longer in Portugal than in
Denmark. The number of rms is far higher in Portugal than in Denmark, and the
average rm size in Portugal is only 30% of that in Denmark. Finally, Danes earn on
average almost six times more than Portuguese.
3.2 Testing Gibrats law
The assumptions underlying our theoretical model imply log employment size of rm
j, njt, to follow a random walk, apart from the dampening e¤ect of the hiring and
ring boundary on short run uctuations in njt. This regularity is known as Gibrats
law. It holds in particular for large rms, see Jovanovic (1982). Though slight
deviations from Gibrats law do not a¤ect the main economic implications of the
theoretical model, it is useful to have at least some idea how close this assumption
is in the data. There is a massive literature on testing Gibrats law, see e.g. De Wit
(2005) or Sutton (1997). Here, we use two tests.
The rst approach is laid out in Abowd and Card (1989) and Topel and Ward
(1992) for log wages; we adapt this methodology for log rmsizes. First, we estimate
njt = 0 + 1Zjt + "jt; (12)
where  is the rst di¤erence operator and where Zjt is vector of controls: age
category of the rm, time e¤ects and industry indicators. Second, we construct the
autocovariance matrix of the residuals "jt of this regression. If njt follows a random
walk, "jt should be uncorrelated across time t. The resulting covariograms for (12)
are reported in Table 2, both for the whole sample of rms and for the subsample
of larger rms (at least 20 employees each year over the sample period of that rm).
The evidence from Table 2. suggests that Gibrats law holds closely, in particular
when we exclude small rms. Most lagged correlations are really small relative to the
variance of shocks that is reported in the rst line. Gibrats law holds slightly better
for Portugal than for Denmark.
The second approach follows Bond et al. (2005), who show that for micro panels
with large cross-sectional and small time dimension, OLS in levels is consistent and
typically more e¢ cient than more complex GMM and ML estimators. Consider a
11Summary statistics for each separate industry (both as broader and 2-digit industry categories)
are available upon request.
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Table 2: 1st Gibrats Law Test: Residual Autocovariances
Denmark Portugal
Lag (1) (2) (1) (2)
0 0.1587 0.0424 0.1162 0.0255
(0.0005) (0.0112) (0.0005) (0.0007)
1 -0.0030 -0.00003 0.0002 -0.0001
(0.0002) (0.0005) (0.0002) (0.0003)
2 -0.0094 -0.0008 -0.0024 0.0012
(0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0004)
3 -0.0020 -0.0002 -0.0013 0.0006
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003)
4 -0.0016 -0.00004 -0.0008 0.0006
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002)
5 -0.0008 -0.0006 -0.0010 0.0001
(0.0002) (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0003)
6 -0.0008 -0.0002 -0.0013 0.0002
(0.0002) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0004)
N obs generating reg 1505926 79425 878919 66369
Specication (1) uses all the rms; specication (2) uses all rms that have at
least 20 employees in each year of their life spans. All generating regressions
use the rst di¤erenced log rm size as dependent variable and control for age
of the rm, time and industry e¤ects. (Robust standard errors in parentheses)
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simple dynamic AR(1) panel data model:
njt = nj;t 1 + ujt, (13)
where ujt  (1 )j+vjt and the initial rm size nj1 = 0+1j+"jj, with jt and
j error terms such that E(j) =E(vjt) = 0 and E(vjtvjs) = 0 for t 6= s. Under the
null of  = 1 the OLS estimator of  in (13) is consistent. We refer to this estimator
of  as the OLS estimator. Under the alternative  < 1, the OLS estimator is biased
upwards, the more so when Var(j)=Var(vjt) is large. In the latter case, one could
use the transformed statistic in Breitung and Meyer (1994), which estimates  from:
njt   nj1 = (nj;t 1   nj1) + "jt (14)
where "jt = vjt   (1   )
 
nj1   j

. The OLS estimator of (14) is consistent again
under the null and again upwards biased under the alternative  < 1, but this time
the bias does not depend on Var(j)=Var(vjt). The results for both methods are
shown in Table 3, both for the full sample and the sample excluding small rms.
The results are very similar to those in Table 2: Gibrats law holds reasonably well,
in particular for large rms, and in particular in Portugal. The value for the mean
squared error of the regressions (MSE) is a good estimate for the parameter  of our
model. It is similar for both countries, being quite large (0.40) for the whole sample,
and about half of that (0.20) for the subsample of larger rms.
Table 3: 2nd Gibrats Law Test: Unit Root Type Regressions
Denmark Portugal
all rms large rms all rms large rms
Coef OLS1 BM1 OLS2 BM2 OLS1 BM1 OLS2 BM2
 .9361 .9208 .9755 .9806 .9594 .9537 .9791 1.043
(.0003) (.0006) (.0012) (.0030) (.0004) (.0009) (.0011) (.0030)
N obs 1505926 79425 878934 66340
R2 0.87 0.70 0.95 0.82 0.91 0.66 0.96 0.84
MSE 0.42 0.43 0.21 0.21 0.36 0.36 0.17 0.17
The dependent variable is logrmsize in OLS columns and (logrmsize-initial
logrmsize) in BM columns. Columns indexed 1 correspond to estimates using
the sample of all rms, while columns 2 correspond to the sample of rms with
at least 20 employees in each year of their life spans. Both regressions control
for age of the rm, time and industry e¤ects. (Robust standard errors in
parentheses).
3.3 Testing the LIFO separation rule
Next, we turn to the second implication of our model, the LIFO separation rule. Since
we apply an e¢ cient bargaining model, the distinction between quits and layo¤s is
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arbitrary, compare McLaughlin (1991). As long as there is a positive surplus of the
workers marginal revenue to the rm above the workers reservation wage, the worker
and the rm will strike a deal. As soon as this surplus has vanished, it is in their
mutual interest to separate. Whether the separation is initiated by the worker or by
the rm is irrelevant. Hence, the model predicts the LIFO separation rule to apply to
separations as a whole, not just to layo¤s separately. We use duration analysis to test
this for this implication. Let the function j(i; t) denote the rm j in which worker
i is employed in period t. We drop the arguments of this function whenever the
identication of the individual and the period of observation are clear. The seniority
level qijt is dened as the log of the number of workers employed at rm j (i; t) at
time t, for at least as long as or longer than worker i; this number includes therefore
worker i herself. Hence, qijt is equal to njt at the moment t when worker i is hired
(assuming that i is the only one hired at time t). Furthermore, for the most senior
worker qijt = 0 because there is only one worker who is employed at the rm as least
as long as herself. Then, the seniority index rijt is dened as the log of the ratio of
the number of people employed at least as long as worker i to the size of rm j at
time t, in logs
rijt  njt   qijt: (15)
The seniority index rijt is a reasonable proxy for the variable zt   q, since zt is
equal to nt, up to a constant, p, and except for the insulation of nt from shocks
in zt when p  < pt < p+, recall the setup of our theoretical model. Were the
LIFO separation rule to apply literally, the seniority index rijt would be the only
determinant of separation. However, there are two reasons why this is not likely to
be the case. First, the workforce of the rm is not completely homogeneous, so that
a rm may wish to diminish its workforce in one skill class but not necessarily for
other skill classes employed within that rm. This may disrupt a strict application
of the LIFO separation rule. Second, workers separate not only due to shocks of the
demand for the rms product, but also due to worker specic shocks, e.g. when a
workers partner gets a new job in another city, which might cause the worker to quit
from his or her current job. A particularly important worker specic factor that does
not t in the LIFO model is retirement. Hence, our ambition is more limited than
what would follow from a strict interpretation of the LIFO separation rule. We just
want to show that rijt has a strong impact on the job separation rate.
We model the transition process by a mixed proportional hazard rates model with
discrete time periods. This implies that the conditional probability of leaving the
rm (i.e. the hazard rate) after Tijt years of tenure can be written as:
(rijt; Zijt; Tijt; vi) =
exp

rijt + Zijt +  Tijt + vi

1 + exp

rijt + Zijt +  Tijt + vi
 (16)
where Zijt is a vector of observed characteristics of the individual and the job, and
where vi represents the unobserved worker heterogeneity. We include a full set of
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dummies  T for every tenure category, which is equivalent to a fully exible speci-
cation of the baseline hazard. Identication of the parameter  of the seniority index
rijt separate of the parameters of the baseline hazard  T requires variation in rijt that
is independent of the tenure Tijt. Such independent variation is available since the
seniority index also depends on the hiring and ring of other workers and thus is a
non-deterministic function of tenure. A LIFO separation rule implies that  should
be negative. For our estimation method we use a two mass-point distribution for the
unobserved heterogeneity. We use up to 10 spells of an individual, which helps to
estimate the unobserved heterogeneity distribution. We use a discrete time model,
since workers are observed only once per year. Hence, we cannot observe the exact
moment at which the worker enters or leaves the rm.12 In addition, short spells are
underrepresented since a worker has to stay at least till the next period of observation.
With the data at hand, we cannot correct for these problems. Using a discrete time
analysis is the best we can do.
At some point in time, older workers leave the rm for retirement. This process
is independent of the LIFO separation rule. Therefore, we exclude workers above
the age of 55 from the analysis. Spells started before the age of 55 and nished
afterwards are therefore right censored. Women are also more likely to leave the rm
for non-participation. Hence, we separate our results for men and women. We delete
spells that are left censored since we cannot compute the seniority of an individual
for the periods before she enters our observation sample. Since this seniority a¤ects
the probability that the individual survives till the start of the sample period, we
cannot easily correct for left censoring. Deleting the left-censored spells implies that
we have a maximum of 22 years of tenure in Denmark and 10 for Portugal. The vector
Zijt includes education, potential experience and indicators for region, industry and
occupation.
Table 4 lists the main results. We nd a negative and signicant impact of seniority
for both women and men, with small di¤erences between these categories, in both
Denmark and Portugal, in accordance with the LIFO separation rule. Though the
actual coe¢ cients are not reported here, we also nd negative duration dependence
and evidence of unobserved heterogeneity.13 Apparently, seniority does not pick up
all the variation in separation rates over the course of a job spell. There are two
explanations for this phenomenon. First, as noted before, our seniority index might
not exactly correspond to the actual layo¤ ordering, since the rms workforce is
likely to be heterogeneous with separate LIFO ordering to apply to subsets of the
workforce. This is equivalent to measurement error in our seniority index rijt, leading
to an attenuation bias in the estimate of  and unobserved variation in the seniority
index being picked up by correlated variables. Second, not all separations are driven
by the uctuations in the demand for the rms product, and hence, the log seniority
12For Portugal, tenures is reported in months. We use this information in the estimation. For the
rest, the modelling is identical to that for Denmark.
13The full estimation results are available upon request.
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index. For example, some separations might be driven by the worker and the rm
learning about the quality of the match, see Jovanovic (1979). These separations do
not t the LIFO pattern.
Table 4: Main results LIFO test
Denmark Portugal
Males Females Males Females
Logrank -0.0577 -0.0357 -0.0549 -0.0669
(0.0019) (0.0025) (0.0054) (0.0065)
Education -0.1169 -0.1267 -0.1204 -0.1446
(0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0009) (0.0012)
Experience -0.0771 -0.0732 -0.0490 -0.0656
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0004)
N obs 10788368 5990891 2118405 1488687
The estimation also controls for occupation, region and industry
indicators. (Standard errors in parantheses)
3.4 Testing dependency of wages on seniority
3.4.1 Empirical specication and returns to seniority within the rm
The third implication of the model is the return to seniority in wages. This can be
tested by extending the standard specication of the log earnings equation with the
seniority index, rijt. Consider the following specication of log wages wijt
wijt = + Xijt + Tijt + rijt + njt + "ijt; (17)
where Xijt is experience. We omit higher order terms in experience and tenure and
other controls (including time e¤ects) from equation (17) for the sake of convenience,
but include them in the estimation. The unobservable term can be decomposed into
four orthogonal components, a match, a rm, a worker, and an idiosyncratic e¤ect14
"ijt = 'ij +  j + i + ijt: (18)
The idiosyncratic e¤ect ijt can also include measurement error. There are all kinds
of reasons for ij;  j; and i to be correlated to Tijt, see Topel (1991) or Altonji
and Williams (2005): good worker-rm relationships tend to survive as the worker
and the rm learn about the quality of their match and bad matches are broken up,
leading to a positive correlation between 'ij+ j+i and Tijt. Search theories imply
14This formulation is similar to Topel (1991: 150), except that we add a rm e¤ect and that we
delete the subscript t from the match e¤ect ij , as Topel does in his application.
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that workers sample new jobs from a job o¤er distribution. The longer this selection
process is going on, the higher the expected value of 'ij +  j since bad jobs do not
survive, leading to a positive correlation between 'ij +  j and Tijt. There are two
obvious solutions to this problem, either within-job rst di¤erencing (FD) or adding
xed e¤ects for every job spell (FE). First di¤erencing yields
wijt = +  + rijt + njt +ijt: (19)
Adding xed e¤ects per job spell is equivalent to estimating (17) by taking deviations
from the mean over time, within a job spell:
ewijt = (+ ) eTijt + erijt + enjt + eijt; (20)
where the upper tilde denotes deviations from the mean per job spell, e.g. ewijt =
wijt   wijt, with wijt the mean over time of wijt. We exclude eXijt from (20) because
it is perfectly collinear with eTijt. In both specications above, it is immediately clear
that the rst order e¤ects of tenure and experience are not separately identied.
This problem has troubled all attempts to estimate the return to tenure, see e.g.
Altonji and Shakotko (1987) and the large stream of subsequent papers. The perfect
collinearity of experience and tenure within a job spell rules out estimating the return
to tenure on with spell variation in wages. Hence, researchers had to revert to between
job spell variation in wages. However, since job mobility is not exogenous, using this
type of information introduces all kind of selectivity issues, which the literature has
tried to resolve. Happily, this problem does not a¤ect the estimation of , since rijt
is not perfectly correlated to Tijt. This means that we can use only within job spell
variation in wages to estimate , and hence we do not have to bother about the
selectivity problems that plague data on job mobility.
The choice between the FE and FD estimators above depends on the error struc-
ture of vijt. The closer is vijt to a unit root, the more e¢ cient is the FD method;
the closer vijt is to being serially uncorrelated, the more e¢ cient estimation method
is the FE estimator. Previous empirical studies have typically found a high degree
of autocorrelation in vijt, even close to a unit root, see for instance Abowd and Card
(1979) and Topel and Ward (1992). From that perspective, equation (19) is likely to
be most e¢ cient. However, this equation assumes that the e¤ect of rijt and njt on wijt
is immediate. Any lagged impact will not be captured after rst di¤erencing. From
that perspective, equation (20) is preferred, since there lagged e¤ects of rijt and njt
will be captured. Hence, one would expect higher estimates for  and  from using
equation (20) than from (19).15 In the strict version of our model, where separation is
completely governed by the LIFO separation rule, rijt and njt are perfectly correlated
within a job spell, since more senior workers will never leave the rm before worker
i, so that the only variation in rijt comes from variation in njt. The same argument
15We report robust standard errors, so that correlation between the residuals over time does not
a¤ect their validity.
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applies to erijt and enjt. Hence,  and  are not separately identied in that world
neither in equation (19) nor in (20). Happily, LIFO does not apply in a strict sense.
The most compelling reason for a violation of the LIFO separation rule is workers
retirement, but also other individual specic shocks discussed earlier in this section.
These separations allow separate identication of  and  with FE and FD estimators.
Table 5: Residual Autocovariances for Within-Job LogWage Innovations
Lag Denmark Portugal
0 0.0231 0.0273
(0.00002) (0.00007)
1 -0.0043 -0.0082
(0.00001) (0.00006)
2 -0.0006 -0.0008
(8.7e-06) (0.00003)
3 -0.0003 -0.0004
(9.0e-06) (0.00003)
4 -0.0003 9.2e-06
(9.5e-06) (0.00003)
5 -0.00008 -0.00008
(0.00001) (0.00004)
6 -0.0001 -0.0006
(0.00001) (0.00005)
N obs generating reg 14907897 5758655
The generating regressions are the FD wage regressions with logrank includes, see the
FD2 columns in the next table. (Robust standard errors in parentheses)
First, we check the characteristics of the dynamic process of vijt. Table 5 reports
the variance-covariance ofvijt, analogous to what we did for log rm sizes in Table 2.
For both countries, the covariance of "ijt with its rst lag is substantial, the covariance
with higher lags is negligible. Hence, the process is well approximated by an MA(1)
process, made up of a mixture permanent and transitory shocks. Abowd and Card
(1979) and Topel and Ward (1992) nd similar results for the United States. The
standard deviation of the permanent shocks can be calculated as 0.12 for Denmark
and 0.10 for Portugal.16 These numbers are of the same order of magnitude as found
for the United States.
16Let qijt and uijt be the transitory and permanent shock respectively. Then:
vijt = uijt + qijt   qij;t 1:
Hence: Var(vijt) =Var(uijt) + 2Var(qijt) and Cov(vijt;vij;t 1) =  Var(qijt), so that:
Var(uijt) =Var(vijt) + 2Cov(vijt;vij;t 1).
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This evidence suggests that in terms of e¢ ciency of the estimation method we
might prefer FD, while in terms of allowing for a lagged e¤ect of rijt on wijt we
might prefer FE. Hence, we report both the FD and FE estimator. Our regressions
control for up to quartic terms in tenure and experience, log rmsize and industry,
occupation, and region dummies. In Table 6 we report the results17. We present the
estimation results for two specications, one excluding log seniority rijt and another
including it. We can draw the following conclusions. First, all coe¢ cients for log
seniority are positive and statistically signicant. Second, the coe¢ cients are larger
for FE than for FD, as was expected because FE allows for a lagged e¤ect of rijt on
wijt, while FD does not. Third, comparing the estimation results with and without
seniority, including seniority reduces the coe¢ cients for tenure and log rmsize by
5-30 %. The coe¢ cients for experience are hardly a¤ected by including seniority.
The e¤ect of tenure and log rmsize on wages is at least partly a proxy for the e¤ect
of seniority. We can expect seniority to be measured with the greater measurement
error than tenure and rmsize. Apart from straightforward reporting errors, the main
source of measurement error in tenure is who exactly is the relevant employer. Some
job changes might either be classied as between rms, justifying the tenure clock
being set back to zero, or as within the rm, which does not a¤ect the tenure clock.
However, this source of measurement error only a¤ects changes at the borderline
of the denition of a rm. This is likely to be only a small fraction of the rms
workforce. However, misclassication of the tenure of even a single worker a¤ects
the measurement of the seniority of all other workers in the rm. In general, any
measurement error in tenure or rm size automatically feeds into seniority, while on
top of that, seniority is also a¤ected by measurement errors because separate seniority
statistics are likely to apply for subgroups of the workforce. We can therefore expect
that actual e¤ect of seniority on wages is larger than estimated here, and that part
of the e¤ect of tenure and log rm size is still a proxy for measurement error in the
seniority variable. Finally, the e¤ect of seniority is twice as high in Portugal as in
Denmark.
3.4.2 Returns to seniority within gender and education subgroups
We repeat the analysis separately for males and females, and for low- and high-
educated workers. The results are reported in Table 7. The results for male and
female categories do not di¤er much. The only apparent exception is for Denmark,
when using the FE estimator, where the estimated coe¢ cient for males is twice as high
as for females, though they are the same when using the FD estimator. At the same
time, and linked to the previous observation, the estimates by gender categories really
do not di¤er much from the estimate when using the whole samples, for either country.
17Results for the same analysis performed for each of our broad industry categoriesenumerated
in subsection 3.4.3 are qualitatively identical (with some between-industry heterogeneity in the
magnitude of the estimated seniority coe¢ cients) to the results at the national level in Table 6.
They are available upon request from the authors.
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Our interpretation is therefore that seniority positions within gender categories are
no more relevant for wage determination than the seniority position within the rm
as a whole, and hence splitting by gender is not likely to attenuate the measurement
error in seniority index. However, the estimation results for education groups show
that the e¤ect of seniority is much larger for higher educated workers than for low
educated workers. The impact of seniority on wages is lower for the low-educated
workers, compared to corresponding estimates from Table 6, and the FE estimate is
even signicantly negative for Denmark, though small in absolute value. The impact
of seniority on wages within the high educated group is much larger, both in Denmark
and in Portugal. These results are consistent with the fact that high educated workers
have steeper wage-tenure proles than their low-educated peers. At the same time,
they give support to the fact that the relevant seniority hierarchy within the rm is
already more realistically captured when accounting for education levels.
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3.4.3 Returns to seniority and rm monopoly power
Our theoretical model also predicts that the return to seniority, =, is partly driven
by the degree of monopoly power,  1. We test this hypothesis by analyzing whether
the variation in the return to seniority across industries can be explained by the
degree of monopoly power in each industry. We take the log of the number of rms in
each industry as proxy for the degree of monopoly power. We regress the estimated
coe¢ cient for seniority for each industry on this log number of rms and a constant
term, using both simple OLS and Weighted Least Squares (WLS) specications. We
use two measures as "number of rms" in an industry: the sum of all rms that were
at any time active in that industry during the sample period, and respectively, the
median number of rms over the sample period. We use two industries classications,
a broad classication with 12 industries for Denmark and 11 for Portugal18 and a
more rened classication where we use all 2-digit Standard Industry Classication
(SIC) industry sub-categories available, increasing the number of observations in the
regressions to 40 for Denmark and 49 for Portugal. For our prediction to be veried,
we expect negative estimates of the coe¢ cients of log number of rms.
The estimation results for the regressions of returns to seniority on the log number
of rms by industry are presented in Table 8. Most of the estimated coe¢ cients
of interest are not signicantly di¤erent from 0 (though most slightly negative in
magnitude), both when using the WLS and the OLS methods and regardless of using
as dependent variables the FD or the FE coe¢ cients previously estimated in this
paper, and as independent variables the sum or the median of the number rms in an
industry. There are very few cases where the results are statistically signicant: when
using the broad industry categories for Portugal we get signicant coe¢ cients of the
expected sign with the FE method, but signicant coe¢ cients of the opposite sign in
Denmark; when using the OLS for 2-digit industries in Portugal we get signicantly
positive coe¢ cients for the FD method and again signicantly positive when using the
WLS for the FD, sum of rms, and FE, median of rms. In conclusion, we regard this
test as inconclusive. The explanatory variables used as proxy for the monopoly power
of an industry are not strong enough to isolate the e¤ect of the degree of monopoly
power on the return to seniority.
18The broad industry categories we use are: 1. Manufacturing; 2. Electricity, gas and water supply;
3. Construction; 4. Wholesale and retail trade, repairs; 5. Hotels and restaurants; 6. Transport, post
and communications; 7. Financial intermediation; 8. Real estate, renting and business activities;
9. (private rms operating in) Public administration and defense, compulsory social security; 10.
Education; 11. Health and social work; 12. Other community, social and personal service activities.
Note: For Portugal we miss category 9 (no rms are privately owned in that sector).
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4 Summary and conclusions
We have shown beyond reasonable doubt that for both Denmark and Portugal there
exists a return to seniority in wages, with an elasticity in the order of magnitude of
0.01-0.02: a 1 % increase in the seniority hierarchy of the rm raises your wage by
0.01-0.02 %. This return is almost twice as high for higher educated workers, and it
is twice as high in Portugal as it is in Denmark. Some 5-30 % of what has been know
as the return to tenure and to rmsize is in fact a return to seniority. This implies
that standard explanations of the return to tenure, like Jovanovics (1979) learning,
or the search models, and subsequent versions of these models, cannot provide a full
explanation of what is going on, if only because these explanations focus solely on
the features of the worker herself (in case of learning, her ability; in case of search,
her job o¤er history), while the return to seniority links the fate of the worker to that
of the rm as a whole. A return to seniority implies that a worker is to some extent
shareholder in her own rm. Hence, it makes the link between labor economics and
nance.
Our theoretical model provides a special interpretation of the return to seniority, as
being due to a hold up problem, where rms pay the full cost of the specic investment,
while workers capture part of the return. This setup leads to ine¢ ciently low hiring.
All these conclusions are conditional on the assumption that the rm bears the full
cost of specic investments, an assumption that has not been tested empirically in
this paper. How to do that remains an open question. An indirect answer can be
obtained by analysing who is queueing for whom: when workers queue for jobs, so
that there is unemployment, rms are held up by their incumbent workforce; when
it is the other way around, and there are vacancies, workers are held up by their
employer. As long as workers are risk neutral and either investment or wages are
contractible, e¢ cient hiring can be obtained by using the sharing rule of the costs for
the one, to mirror the sharing rule for the other, thereby satisfying the Hosios (1990)
condition. When workers are risk averse, e¢ ciency can only be obtained when both
investment and wages are contractible, such that the costs of investment are fully
attributed to the rm and there is no seniority prole. Any other allocation assigns
part of the risky return to the risk averse player. In that sense, our estimation results
point to incompleteness in the insurance market. Nevertheless, our analysis does not
imply that LIFO layo¤ rules are bad per se. They can o¤er a useful protection to
the property rights of incumbent workers on their share of the specic investment,
thereby helping the rm to solve a commitment problem. Without a resolution of
this commitment problem, incumbents would have all reasons not to cooperate in the
transfer of tacit knowledge to newly hired workers.
We have established the existence of a return to seniority for Denmark and Por-
tugal. Whether such a return exists in other countries, in particular in the United
States, remains an open question. We bet it does; the large return to tenure in the
United States as compared to Denmark and Portugal, see e.g. Teulings and Hartog
(1998:36-37) suggests so. One might argue that returns to seniority are largely driven
36
by legal institutions, and that these institutions are entirely di¤erent and more mar-
ket oriented in the United States. We think however that the economic mechanisms
for having a LIFO layo¤ rule exist everywhere, and that the legal institutions might
very well just be a formalisation of rules of conduct and implicit contracts that would
have emerged anyway.
Our model suggests that hold up problems reduce turnover, and thereby specic
investment (because turnover requires new specic investment to be made). This
conclusion is contingent on the way specic investment is modelled here, namely as
a xed amount to be invested in one shot, at the beginning of the job. When the
amount of investment can vary both in size and in timing, this conclusion might
change. Then, a longer expected job duration might invoke more specic investment,
which in turn would lengthen the expected job duration since the productivity at the
job is raised relative to the productivity at the outside market. In such a world, a rm
responds along two margins of adjustment, when the demand for its product goes up.
First, it hires additional workers, and second, it expands the specic investment in its
incumbent workforce. This model would provide further legitimation for a LIFO rule,
not as legal constraint, but as an e¢ cient economic institution. Again, we postpone
this for future research.
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A Derivation
Substitution of equation (3), (5), (6), and (7) in equation (8) yields2664
0
0
I
0
3775 =
2664
1  1 1  1
1      +
E  F G  H
E F  G +H
3775
2664
R
 
C 
C+
3775 ;
where
   < 0; +  + > 1;   
 
 (    ) > 0;
C B  exp  p  ; C+  B+ exp +p  ;
R r   1 1 exp p     > 0;  p+   p ;
E exp [] ; F  exp [] ; G  exp   ; H  exp + :
Elimination of C  from the rst two equations of this system yields equation (9).
Matrix inversion yields2664
R
 
C 
C+
3775 =
2664
1  1 1  1
1      +
E  F G  H
E F  G +H
3775
 1 2664
0
0
I
0
3775 ;
We are interested in solution with  > 0. The second equation of this system can be
written as
I R ()=  S (; ) ; (21)
R ()   +    E +  +   1 G+  1   +H;
S (; )  +   1       (FG+ EH) + (1  )  +     (EF +GH)
   1     +    (FH + EG) ;
R (0)= 0; R (0) =
 
1     +   1  +     > 0; R ()  0;
S (0; ) = 0; S (0; ) = 0; S (0; ) > 0; S (; )  0:
Hence
lim
!0
S (; )
R ()
=
S (0; )
2R (0)
 = 0;
@
@
S (; )
R ()
> 0;
lim
!1
S (; )
R ()
=1:
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where the second line follows from the evaluation of higher order derivatives. Hence,
there is a unique positive solution for . The other three equations can be written
as
R=
  (+    ) F + (+   ) G+ (    )+H
R ()
 ; (22)
C =
  (+   )E + (+   1) F + (1  )+H
R ()
 ;
C+=
(    )E   (1   ) F + (1  ) G
R ()
 :
By a similar argument, one can prove that the numerators of these expression are
always positive. Hence, a positive solution for R;C ; and C+ exists for every  > 0.
This implies a positive solution for B  and B+. Totally di¤erentiating equation
(21) with respect to  and  yields an expression for d=d. Totally di¤erentiating
equation (22) with respect to  and  and using the expression for d=d proves
@B+
@
< 0,@p
+
@
> 0, and @p
 
@
< 0.
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